


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DATE: SEP 2005


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PORTUGUESE TIMOR

[redacted]

Neither portion of Suharto's two-pronged program for Timor has produced noteworthy results. On the diplomatic front, Lisbon has continued to assert its desire to negotiate a settlement, but has set no timetable. None of the various parties seems to be in agreement on a venue or a format for discussions. The governor of Timor has been recalled to Lisbon for consultations, but there is no word about what proposals, if any, are being considered.

Jakarta has been keeping the pressure on Lisbon, but is concerned that Portugal will ultimately wash its hands of Timor and recognize the de facto rule claimed by the leftist Fretilin party, which now controls most major towns. Lisbon thus far has been careful to do nothing that might be interpreted by Jakarta as a deliberate threat to Indonesian interests, but at the same time it is clear that Portugal is in no position to enforce its will on Fretilin. Fretilin's leaders, buoyed by recent military successes, are taking a hard line against cooperating with the other Timorese parties or participating in any negotiations that include them. Fretilin asserts that its control of east Timor entitles it to represent all Timorese in discussions with Lisbon.

[redacted] The pro-Indonesia Timorese are too few, too poorly armed, and too badly trained to offer a serious challenge to the Fretilin forces. The core of the pro-Fretilin fighting units are former members of the provincial militia trained by the Portuguese, in which Timorese served as the rank and file and filled some noncommissioned officer positions.

The pro-Indonesia forces also suffer from their inability to arouse popular enthusiasm for their cause. In towns they have occupied with Jakarta's help, they often face an indifferent and sometimes hostile population, and once the Indonesian troops have withdrawn, the Timorese have been unable to defend their positions.

[redacted] Recent press reports from Jakarta that claim Fretilin forces crossed the border and attacked Indonesian

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Timor may have been released by military officers in an effort to add pressure on Suharto. He will find it hard to refuse to authorize military retaliation, and the commanders clearly hope that he will permit more than just a tit-for-tat reprisal. Thus far, however, Suharto has only ordered a strengthening of Indonesian positions along the border, leaving open the question of whether he will permit pursuit of the alleged attackers into Timorese territory.

[REDACTED]

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